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27 
UNMASKING THE MASK-MAKER:  DOMAIN 
PRIVACY SERVICES AND CONTRIBUTORY 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
 
“Domain privacy services” are online services that protect the ano-
nymity of their website-operating customers.  Typically, the privacy service 
registers a domain name on behalf of its website-operating customer, and 
then leases the domain name back to the customer.  The customer retains 
the right to use and control the domain, while the privacy service holds it-
self out as the true owner through the registrar’s WHOIS database.  Copy-
right-infringing website owners prefer this arrangement to avoid prosecu-
tion by forcing aggrieved copyright holders to first contact the listed 
privacy service, which typically refuses to reveal the identity of the alleged 
infringer.  This Comment argues that privacy services which license do-
main names to known copyright infringers should be held secondarily li-
able on a contributory copyright infringement theory.  Further, this Com-
ment proposes a new model cease-and-desist letter warning privacy 
services that this licensing scheme likely violates ICANN rules as well as 
most privacy services’ own “terms of service” agreements, and likely opens 
the privacy service to contributory copyright infringement liability.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine trying to operate a successful record label or movie studio in 
a world fraught with widespread illegal file sharing.  Imagine that someone 
has created a website dedicated to distributing your company’s content on-
line for free without your permission.  You run a domain ownership query 
on the unauthorized site at www.WHOIS.org—a phone book-like directory 
listing of all website operators—to find the name and e-mail address of the 
person running the site1 so that you can issue your routine cease-and-desist 
letter.2  Instead of displaying the site operator’s contact information, the di-
                                                           
1. Wikipedia, Whois, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whois (last visited Aug. 26, 2010) 
[hereinafter Wikipedia, Whois]. 
2. See generally Richard Keyt, Internet Copyright Law:  A Rat Pilfered My Web Site 
Cheese - What Do I Do?, KEYTLAW, Nov. 9, 2002, 
http://www.keytlaw.com/Copyrights/cheese.htm. 
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rectory lists something called a “privacy service” as the site owner, and 
gives you the privacy service’s contact information.3  
  You send numerous e-mail complaints to the privacy service, all of 
which are ignored, and you have no other way to contact the person run-
ning the unauthorized site.  Your lawyer tells you that the privacy service is 
not intimidated by threats or demands of any kind, and the only way to ob-
tain the identity of the person running the unauthorized site is to subpoena 
the privacy service’s customer records, which requires filing an expensive 
lawsuit.4  Meanwhile, new unauthorized sites have appeared on the Inter-
net, and you simply cannot afford to issue a subpoena against every “pri-
vate” infringer.5  The privacy service stands between you and the biggest 
threat to your business—Internet piracy—and there is nothing you can do 
about it.  
After Napster ushered in a culture of online file sharing, many copy-
right holders faced extinction unless they could successfully assume the 
burden of policing the Internet for copyright infringement.6  Those media 
companies that could afford to hire teams of lawyers to enforce their copy-
rights developed anti-piracy programs7 or outsourced the police work to 
private enforcement agencies.8  Much of today’s anti-piracy efforts focus 
on policing illicit uses of complex Peer-to-Peer and BitTorrent technolo-
gies,9 but traditional client-server or website-based commission or facilita-
tion of copyright infringement remains a problem for many copyright hold-
ers.10  “Cyberlockers,” such as Rapidshare, for example, are website-based 
file sharing services that allow users to post content for retrieval by others, 
                                                           
3. Domains By Proxy, How Private Registrations Work, 
http://www.domainsbyproxy.com/GetDBP.aspx (last visited Aug. 25, 2010) [hereinafter How 
Private Registrations Work]. 
4. See Domains By Proxy, Domains By Proxy Civil Subpoena Policy, 
http://domainsbyproxy.com/popup/subpoenapolicies.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) [hereinafter 
Domains By Proxy Civil Subpoena Policy].  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
5. See Domains By Proxy Civil Subpoena Policy, supra note 4. 
6. See generally David Lieberman, Piracy Pillages Music Industry, USATODAY.COM, Apr. 
8, 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/money/covers/2002-04-05-music-piracy.htm (warning that the 
music industry could collapse as a result of widespread illegal file sharing). 
7. See, e.g., Press Release, Universal Music Group, David Benjamin Named Senior Vice 
President, Anti-Piracy, Universal Music Group (July 15, 2002), available at 
http://www.universalmusic.com/corporate/news35192. 
8. See generally BayTSP.com, Tracking, http://www.baytsp.com./services/tracking.html 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2010). 
9. See id. (stating that an anti-piracy enforcement agency uses new technology to scan 
peer-to-peer and BitTorrent networks for infringing content). 
10. See Posting of Vic to Code Confidential, 
http://vilabs.typepad.com/vilabs/2009/06/ubiquitous-cyberlocker-file-share-service-gets-
fined.html (June 25, 2009, 16:41 EST). 
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often in exchange for a flat monthly or yearly fee.11  Despite the relatively 
simple client-server technology relied upon by Cyberlockers, the sheer 
number and popularity of these types of sites makes online copyright en-
forcement very difficult.12 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)13 allows copyright 
holders to send a cease-and-desist letter called a “takedown notice” to sus-
pected infringers or their Internet service providers (“ISP”).14  Recipients 
then have the opportunity to respond by removing the infringing content or 
challenging the allegation contained in the notice.15  Part of a copyright 
holder’s day-to-day enforcement includes sending takedown notices to 
website operators or their ISPs who commit or facilitate copyright in-
fringement.16  Today, the takedown notice procedure has become less bur-
densome with the help of digital fingerprinting and automated notice-and-
takedown technology,17 but infringers have become equally resourceful and 
have found ways to remain anonymous online.18  When a copyright holder 
cannot determine the e-mail or physical address of a suspected infringer 
and cannot contact the infringer’s ISP because of the use of anonymity 
services or software, the takedown procedure is useless.19 
The Internet Coalition for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is 
a U.S. nonprofit corporation20 that is widely regarded as the closest thing to 
a “government” of the Internet.21  ICANN controls the top level domains of 
                                                           
11. Id.  
12. Id. 
13. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
14. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
15. See id. § 512(g)(1)–(3). 
16. See generally David Krauets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the Law That 
Saved the Web, WIRED.COM, Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/ten-years-
later (describing routine uses of the DMCA takedown procedure). 
17. BayTSP.com, supra note 8.  
18. See Wikipedia, Anonymizer, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anonymizer (last visited Jan. 
30, 2010) (describing various technologies used to create anonymity and make Internet activity 
untraceable).  
19. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 
1999) (explaining that “[p]arties who have been injured by [copyright infringement] are likely to 
find themselves chasing the [anonymous] tortfeasor from Internet Service Provider (ISP) to ISP, 
with little or no hope of actually discovering the identity of the tortfeasor.”). 
20. ICANN, About, http://www.ICANN.org/en/about/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2010) [herein-
after ICANN, About]. 
21. See generally Kathleen E. Fuller, ICANN: The Debate Over Governing the Internet, 
2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2 (2001), 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/ARTICLES/2001dltr0002.html (comparing ICANN to a 
government of the Internet). 
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the Internet (.com, .net) and sets policies regarding the sale of “parcels” of 
the Internet in the form of web domains.22  ICANN delegates to “regis-
trars”23  the power to activate and sell domain names through an agreement 
called the Registrar Accreditation Agreement (“RAA”).24  Registrars sell 
the domain names to “registrants” or “registered name holders,” who are 
the ultimate consumers and owners of the web domains.25  
Currently, ICANN policy requires that all domain registrants make 
their personal information—including name and e-mail address—available 
in each registrar’s publicly-accessible WHOIS database.26  The RAA 
charges registrars with maintaining a complete and accurate WHOIS data-
base as a condition of remaining an accredited seller of domain names.27  
This policy is widely criticized because spammers, data harvesters, and 
even stalkers can freely access the database to obtain any website owner’s 
personal information.28  On the other hand, the WHOIS database forces 
website owners to be accountable for their actions online and aids law en-
forcement in fighting cybercrime.29  The WHOIS database is instrumental 
to intellectual property holders’ enforcement of their rights because it al-
lows them to identify infringers quickly and efficiently.30  
In response to privacy concerns surrounding the WHOIS database, 
“domain privacy services” such as Domains By Proxy and WhoisGuard 
began offering anonymity protection service to website operators.31  The 
service works as follows: the privacy service registers a domain name on 
behalf of its customer and then licenses control of the domain name back to 
                                                           
22. ICANN, About, supra note 20.  
23. Registrars are wholesalers of domain names.  Consumers purchase domain names from 
registrars such as Go Daddy.  See GoDaddy.com, http://www.godaddy.com (last visited Sept. 14, 
2010).  See generally Wikipedia, Domain Name Registrar, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name_registrar (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).  
24. See generally ICANN, May 2009 Registrar Accreditation Agreement, 
http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/ra-agreement-21may09-en.htm [hereinafter RAA]. 
25. Id. 
26. Id., §§ 3.3, 3.7.7.1; see also WHOIS Lookup, http://www.whois.net (last visited Sept. 
14, 2010). 
27. RAA, supra note 24, §§ 3.1, 3.3. 
28. Wikipedia, Domain Privacy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_privacy (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Wikipedia, Domain Privacy]. 
29. See Wikipedia, Whois, supra note 1. 
30. See id.  
31. Domains By Proxy, About Domains By Proxy, 
http://www.domainsbyproxy.com/About.aspx?prog_id= (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 
About Domains By Proxy]; see also WhoisGuard, http://www.whoisguard.com (last visited Sept. 
14, 2010). 
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the customer for a fee.32  The privacy service becomes the registrant and 
owner of the domain name, while the customer/licensee retains the rights to 
use and sell the domain name.33  This licensing scheme is detailed in all 
privacy services’ Terms of Service (“TOS”) agreements with their custom-
ers,34 and the purpose of the arrangement is to cause the privacy service’s 
contact information—not the customer’s—to appear in the registrar’s 
WHOIS database.35  This arrangement complies with ICANN rules because 
the privacy service is correctly named as the owner of the domain in the 
WHOIS database.36  The end result is that the website operator cannot be 
identified through the WHOIS database and cannot be contacted directly by 
anyone except the privacy service.37  
Many website owners have legitimate reasons for remaining anony-
mous, but others use the anonymity to operate infringing websites with im-
punity.38  Copyright holders cannot send DMCA takedown notices to hid-
den infringers, and privacy services typically do not respond to allegations 
of infringement made by aggrieved intellectual property holders.39  DMCA 
Section 512(h) allows copyright holders to send pre-litigation subpoenas to 
“online service providers” to compel release of their infringing customers’ 
contact information,40 however the section does not apply to services that 
do not store infringing content on their servers.41  Domain privacy services 
                                                           
32. See How Private Registrations Work, supra note 3. 
33. Domains By Proxy, Domain Name Proxy Agreement § 2, 
https://www.domainsbyproxy.com/policy/ShowDoc.aspx?pageid=domain_nameproxy (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Domains By Proxy TOS]. 
34. See, e.g., id.; see also Namecheap, Inc., WhoisGuard Service Agreement § 1–2, 
http://www.namecheap.com/legal/whoisguard-agreement.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) [herein-
after WhoisGuard TOS]. 
35. See How Private Registrations Work, supra note 3. 
36. ICANN, FAQ’s, http://www.icann.org/en/faq (last visited Sept. 7, 2010). 
37. About Domains By Proxy, supra note 31.  
38. Posting of Eric Goldman to Tech. & Mktg. L. Blog, 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/05/ (May 28, 2009, 10:15:27 PST) (describing how an 
alleged cybersquatter used a privacy service to commit trademark infringement under the cloak of 
anonymity). 
39. See Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 
(quoting a defendant privacy service that stated “it would ‘remain neutral’” in a dispute between 
an infringer customer and an aggrieved trademark holder); see also Domains by Proxy, Fre-
quently Asked Questions, 
http://products.secureserver.net/products/domains_by_proxy/dbp_faq.htm#correspondence (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2010) (stating that Domains By Proxy merely forwards e-mail complaints to its 
customers) [hereinafter Domains by Proxy FAQ’s]. 
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h).  
41. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 
1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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are not subject to these subpoenas because they offer no such file storage 
functions.42 
 Seemingly, copyright holders seeking to enforce their rights against 
infringers who use privacy services are limited to either (1) requesting that 
the privacy service reveal an infringing customer in the name of fairness or 
(2) compelling release of the infringer’s identity by subpoena through the 
discovery process.43  The first option is tantamount to asking the privacy 
service to vitiate the only service that it provides—a request that would 
surely be ignored.  The second option is untenable because it requires filing 
a costly lawsuit against every suspected infringer,44 which requires a case-
by-case analysis of whether discovery of an alleged infringer’s identity vio-
lates his or her First Amendment right to remain anonymous.45  Neither op-
tion provides any incentive for privacy services to stop harboring infringers 
or to monitor illicit use of their services.  
Without other viable alternatives, an aggrieved copyright holder 
should consider bringing a contributory copyright infringement action 
against a privacy service for knowingly assisting certain customers in the 
commission of copyright infringement.  A successful suit would set a valu-
able precedent for privacy services’ joint liability for copyright infringe-
ment, which would deter privacy services from protecting infringers, and 
encourage them to monitor illicit uses of their services.  Part II of this arti-
cle explores the legal issues and arguments that would likely be raised in 
such a lawsuit.  
Before filing a complaint, however, an aggrieved copyright holder 
should send a letter to the privacy service demanding release of the alleged 
infringer’s contact information and warning of the legal consequences for 
knowingly assisting infringers.  A strongly-worded letter containing clear 
evidence of the infringing activity should influence the privacy service to 
reconsider its privacy policy in the limited situation where a person’s intel-
lectual property rights are being violated.  Part III of this article discusses 
the legal support for this “demand letter.”  Part V contains a sample de-
                                                           
42. Wikipedia, Domain Privacy, supra note 28 (stating that domain privacy services solely 
provide private registration or “forwarding” services). 
43. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
44. Id. 
45. See Columbia, 185 F.R.D. at 578–80 (requiring a plaintiff seeking to discover the iden-
tity of a “Doe” defendant to (1) identify the defendant with enough specificity to allow the court 
to determine whether the defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal court; 
(2) recount the steps taken to locate the defendant; (3) show that the action could survive a motion 
to dismiss; and (4) file a request for discovery with the court identifying the persons or entities on 
whom discovery process might be served).  Variations of this test are used in different jurisdic-
tions.  See Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 951 (D.C. 2009). 
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mand letter that could be adapted and sent to a privacy service as a prelude 
to litigation. 
Today, exposing infringers to liability requires exposing those who 
intentionally assist them as well.  Privacy services and their customers 
should understand that the law strikes a balance between the right to ano-
nymity and the protection of those harmed by its abuse.46 
II.  DOMAIN PRIVACY SERVICES THAT KNOWINGLY ASSIST CUSTOMERS IN 
THE COMMISSION OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BE FOUND 
LIABLE ON A THEORY OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT 
A copyright holder filing an action against an anonymous infringer 
should also pursue any privacy service that knowingly assists the infringer 
using a theory of contributory liability.  The copyright holder should file a 
complaint alleging a direct copyright infringement claim against the 
anonymous infringer as a “Doe” defendant,47 and the privacy service 
should be named as an additional defendant and pursued on a claim of con-
tributory copyright infringement.48  Filing a lawsuit would allow a copy-
right holder to obtain the identity of the “Doe” infringer through issuing a 
subpoena in discovery.49  However, a plaintiff must overcome a First 
Amendment hurdle before a court can compel release of an anonymous de-
fendant’s identity.50   
On the merits of the case, contributory copyright infringement re-
quires:   (1) direct infringement by a third party51 and that the defendant (2) 
                                                           
46. See Solers, 977 A.2d at 951 (“[W]e must strike a balance ‘between the well-established 
First Amendment right to speak anonymously, and the right of the plaintiff to protect its proprie-
tary interests . . . through the assertion of recognizable claims based on the actionable conduct of 
the anonymous, fictitiously-named defendant.’” (quoting Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 
A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001))). 
47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(3) (permitting plaintiff to amend defendant’s name on com-
plaint while retaining original filing date). 
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (permitting joinder of defendants). 
49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(D). 
50. See Columbia, 185 F.R.D. at 578–80 (requiring a plaintiff seeking to discover the iden-
tity of a “Doe” defendant to (1) identify the defendant with enough specificity to allow the Court 
to determine whether the defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal court; 
(2) recount the steps taken to locate the defendant; (3) show that the action could survive a motion 
to dismiss; and (4) file a request for discovery with the court identifying the persons or entities on 
whom discovery process might be served).  This article assumes personal jurisdiction, and that 
the copyright holder has a strong infringement claim.  So long as the plaintiff has a serious, non-
frivolous claim, these requirements are likely satisfied, and the privacy service must comply with 
the subpoena. 
51. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
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knowingly and (3) materially contributed to the direct infringement.52  Con-
tributory copyright infringement liability is not expressly provided for in 
the copyright statutes,53 but the doctrine arose in the brick-and-mortar con-
text, where absentee-landlords and flea market owners were held liable for 
the infringing activities of their patrons.54  A defendant privacy service 
should be expected to vigorously dispute the “material contribution” ele-
ment, as this case involves cyberspace intangibles such as domain names 
and Internet anonymity, which are not squarely addressed in the leading 
contributory infringement cases.  In the 21st century, however, the distinc-
tion between real space and cyberspace is only minimally helpful, and the 
analysis turns on how directly or indirectly the secondary infringer assists 
the primary infringer.55 
Two complete defenses to contributory copyright infringement have 
developed amid changes in technology:  the DMCA Section 512(a) pro-
vides immunity for certain kinds of Internet service providers,56 and the 
Supreme Court created a complete defense for makers of products capable 
of both infringing and non-infringing uses in the seminal Sony-Betamax 
case.57  The latter defense protects makers of “staple article[s] of com-
merce” such as photocopiers, cameras, and recorders.58  Privacy services 
should be expected to raise both of these defenses, as well as a third de-
fense based on a First Amendment right to protect the anonymous speech 
of others.59  However, the court should reject all of these defenses and im-
                                                                                                                                      
1971). 
52. Id. 
53. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996). 
54. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 816 n.10 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“It is true that [the absentee-landlord] cases were developed in a brick 
and mortar world . . . .”); see also Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (holding flea market owner liable for 
contributory copyright infringement because the infringing activity could not take place “without 
the support services provided by the [flea market] . . . .”). 
55. See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 796 (“The [Defendants] cannot be said to materially con-
tribute to the infringement in this case because they have no direct connection to that infringe-
ment . . . .”); see also id. at 816 n.10 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“It is true that [the absentee-
landlord] cases were developed in a brick and mortar world, but the distinction they draw be-
tween those who materially assist infringement (and are therefore liable) and those who are more 
remotely involved (and are therefore not liable) is equally important-perhaps even more impor-
tant-in cyberspace than in real space.”). 
56. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).  
57. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984). 
58. Id. at 426. 
59. See Solers, 977 A.2d at 950 (observing that anonymous Internet speech is protected by 
the First Amendment).  The privacy service would likely have standing to assert a First Amend-
ment right to remain anonymous on behalf of its customers.  NAACP v. Ala. ex. rel. Patterson, 
357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958); Va. v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n., 484 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1988) (allowing 
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pose liability for the reasons discussed below.  
A.  Direct Infringement by a Third Party 
 Contributory copyright infringement first requires direct infringe-
ment by a third party.60  This article assumes that a copyright holder has a 
strong case of direct infringement against the underlying website operator, 
and will instead focus on the contributory liability of the privacy service.  
The main purpose of the lawsuit would be to create a precedent for privacy 
service liability in the copyright context, which would discourage privacy 
services from protecting customers who they know are abusing the service 
to commit infringement. 
B.  The Knowledge Requirement 
 The second element of contributory copyright infringement requires 
actual or constructive knowledge of the primary infringement.61  Knowl-
edge of specific infringement is not required.62  To prove knowledge, the 
copyright holder must “provide the necessary documentation to show there 
is likely infringement;”63 and “turning a blind eye” by actively taking steps 
to avoid gaining knowledge of the infringement satisfies the knowledge re-
quirement.64   
In Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found that an online news-
group was explicitly put on notice of its users’ infringement when the 
plaintiff record label sent multiple cease-and-desist letters to the defendant, 
and when users admitted to copyright infringement in their communica-
tions with the defendant’s technical support staff.65  In another case, In re 
Aimster Copyright Litig., the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant file 
sharing service had knowledge of its users’ infringing activity when the de-
fendant turned a blind eye toward the infringement by encrypting all trans-
ferred files so that it would be impossible to know which ones were infring-
ing.66 
                                                                                                                                      
third-party standing in free speech case because of potential chilling effect of law on others).  
60. Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
61. Id. at 154. 
62. Id. 
63. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001). 
64. Arista, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 154. 
65. Id. at 139, 155. 
66. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 651 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 
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 Similar to Usenet, a copyright holder can put a privacy service on 
notice of its customer’s infringements by sending notices of infringement 
to the privacy service’s WHOIS address and other addresses listed on the 
privacy service’s website.67  Specific links to infringing content and screen-
shots from the infringing website should be attached to the letter to create 
the strongest possible evidence of infringement.  Such documentation 
should be strong enough to “show there is likely infringement” and pre-
clude a privacy service from arguing that it was not alerted to the infringe-
ment due to weak or insufficient evidence.68  
The privacy service would likely argue that it does not read e-mails 
sent to the address published in the WHOIS database; rather, it merely for-
wards e-mails to its customers,69 and thus it cannot have knowledge of the 
infringement.  However, privacy services are in fact the registrants of the 
domains they register on behalf of others;70 domain owners are expected to 
keep a working e-mail address under ICANN rules;71 many privacy serv-
ices claim to comply with ICANN rules in their TOS agreements;72 and at 
least one privacy service claims to provide “world-class” responsiveness to 
inquiries, complete with “24 by 7 telephone support . . . and a responsive 
staff eager to answer your questions.”73  Consistent failure to respond to in-
fringement notices or affirmatively taking a “neutral”74 position under such 
circumstances may be viewed by a court as turning a blind eye to infringe-
ment75—particularly if the privacy service responds to non-infringement-
related inquiries or provides technical support for its customers.  Like the 
encryption in Aimster, a privacy service does not insulate itself from 
knowledge of the infringement by instituting a policy of evading or for-
warding all complaints from copyright holders.76  Accordingly, strong evi-
                                                                                                                                      
F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter In re Aimster I]. 
67. Domains By Proxy, http://www.domainsbyproxy.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) [here-
inafter Domains By Proxy Homepage]. 
68. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 (quoting Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1374). 
69. Domains By Proxy Homepage, supra note 67. 
70. See Domains By Proxy TOS, supra note 33; see also RAA, supra note 24, § 3.7.7.3.  
71. RAA, supra note 24, §§ 3.7.7.1, 3.7.7.2. 
72. See, e.g., Domains By Proxy TOS, supra note 33, § 4. 
73. See About Domains By Proxy, supra note 31. 
74. See Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (quoting a defendant privacy service that stated 
it would “remain neutral” in a dispute between an infringer customer and an aggrieved trademark 
holder); see also Domains by Proxy FAQ’s, supra note 39.  
75. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter In re 
Aimster II]. 
76. Id. at 650–51 (“Our point is only that a service provider that would otherwise be a con-
tributory infringer does not obtain immunity by using encryption to shield itself from actual 
knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the service is being used.”). 
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dence of infringement delivered to all of the privacy service’s advertised 
addresses should be sufficient to establish at least constructive knowledge 
of infringement. 
C.  Material Contribution 
 The third element of contributory copyright infringement requires 
“material contribution” to the primary infringement.77  Material contribu-
tion is established when the secondary infringer provides the “site and fa-
cilities” for the direct infringement.78  The most hotly contested issue in a 
hypothetical suit would be whether a privacy service provides the “site and 
facilities” for its customer’s infringements by providing domain registra-
tion service, an Internet address, technical support, and anonymity protec-
tion. 
 In Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that 
a swap meet owner provided the “site and facilities” for copyright in-
fringement by providing “space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, 
and customers” for merchants who sold counterfeit recordings on the prem-
ises.79  The court reasoned that “it would be difficult for the infringing 
[sales] to take place in the massive quantities alleged without the support 
services provided by the swap meet.”80  
 In Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California extended the Fonovisa “swap meet” 
reasoning to the online world.81  In denying a privacy service’s motion to 
dismiss a trademark holder’s contributory trademark infringement claim, 
the court stated that the privacy service, which acted as the registrant for 
the domain name used by a “Doe” cybersquatter to commit the underlying 
offense,82 had the requisite “direct control and monitoring of the instrumen-
                                                           
77. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162. 
78. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
79. Id. at 259, 260, 264. 
80. Id. at 259, 264. 
81. Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
82. Cybersquatting in violation of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act typi-
cally involves “[r]egistering a famous trademark as a domain name and then offering it for sale to 
the trademark owner . . . .”  See Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. 
Catalanotte, 342 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2003)); see also Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).  In this atypical case, after the cybersquatter “hack[ed]” into the regis-
trar’s system, transferred plaintiff’s domain to his or her own account, and transferred the stolen 
domain to the defendant privacy service, the privacy service licensed control of the domain back 
to the alleged hacker, who then attempted to ransom the domain name back to the plaintiff.  Solid 
Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.  The court viewed the privacy service as the registrant for the do-
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tality” used for infringement83 to be held liable for contributory trademark 
infringement.84  The court reasoned that, similar to a swap meet owner, the 
privacy service provided the “[I]nternet real estate” utilized by the cyber-
squatter to hijack the plaintiff’s domain name.85  The court also stated that 
the “anonymity service [provided] was central to [the] cybersquatting 
scheme” because the illegal activity would have ceased if the privacy serv-
ice had simply returned the domain name to the plaintiff.86  
Like the utilities, parking, and other support services in Fonovisa,87 it 
would be very difficult to commit website-based copyright infringement 
without the necessary domain address and privacy-cloaking features that 
facilitate infringement with impunity.  Infringers who use their own domain 
names as they appear in the WHOIS database can easily be discovered and 
prosecuted, and such registrations can be terminated by the registrar pursu-
ant to ICANN rules.88  Because the infringement would be more difficult to 
commit or even cease completely without provision of the Internet address 
and the insurance afforded by anonymity, privacy services provide the “site 
and facilities” for infringement to occur.  Although Solid Host was a 
trademark case,89 the licensing scheme deemed “central” to the infringe-
ment scheme in that case90 is no less central to the copyright infringement 
at issue here.  Just as the illegal activity in Solid Host91 would have ceased 
upon termination of the privacy protection,92 infringing website owners 
would cease their illegal activities if they were exposed to liability upon 
removal of the anonymity protection.  
In response to the copyright holder’s argument, a defendant privacy 
service would:  (1) challenge the real estate-Internet address analogy; (2) 
object to the application of a trademark case in the copyright context; (3) 
argue that “anonymity” should be extricated from the domain licensing 
scheme and analyzed as a First Amendment issue; and (4) challenge the 
causal relationship between providing anonymity and the commission or 
facilitation of copyright infringement.  Each of these counterarguments will 
                                                                                                                                      
main.  Id. at 1115.  
83. Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (citing Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solu-
tions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
84. Id. at 1116.   
85. Id. at 1115.   
86. Id. at 1115.   
87. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
88. RAA, supra note 24, § 3.7.7.11. 
89. Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. 
90. Id. at 1115. 
91. Id. at 1092.   
92. Id. at 1115. 
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be examined in turn.  
1.  The Analogy Between Real Estate and Domain Names 
There is some debate over whether infringement cases that arose in 
the brick-and-mortar context should apply to the Internet.93  A defendant 
privacy service would likely object to a comparison of the Fonovisa flea 
market to an Internet address.  In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass'n, 
the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant credit card company’s provision of a 
payment transaction system for purchases of infringing content over a web-
site did not amount to a material contribution, because the infringing pur-
chases could occur even without the payment transaction system.94  In 
reaching its decision, the court rejected the plaintiff’s application of the 
Fonovisa case and stated that brick-and-mortar infringement cases should 
not be applied to the online world.95  
However, some judges are more willing to accept the real estate-
intellectual property connection.  The Solid Host court comfortably drew an 
analogy between landowners and domain owners by accepting the flea 
market analogy and describing the defendant privacy service as a “cyber-
landlord of Internet real-estate.”96  The court in A & M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc. relied on the flea market analogy when it held that “site and 
facilities” encompasses file storage computers, which are arguably less 
analogous to real estate than domain names.97  While computer servers are 
mobile, domain names, like real estate, derive their value and utility from 
their unique locations in space.98  Finally, the Perfect 10 court explicitly 
stated that providing a “website” would count as a “site” under the material 
contribution test.99  Arguably, privacy services that license domain 
                                                           
93. See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 798 n.9 (“We similarly take little comfort in the dissent’s 
resurrection of the ‘dance-hall-owner/absentee-landlord’ cases as a source of any principled dis-
tinction in this area. Those tests were developed for a brick-and-mortar world, and . . . they do not 
lend themselves well to application in an electronic commerce context.”). 
94. Id. at 797–98. 
95. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 798 n.9 (“We similarly take little comfort in the dissent's resur-
rection of the ‘dance-hall-owner/absentee-landlord’ cases as a source of any principled distinction 
in this area. Those tests were developed for a brick-and-mortar world, and . . . they do not lend 
themselves well to application in an electronic commerce context.”). 
96. Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.   
97. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.  
98. See 5 Ways Domain Names Are Better Than Real Estate, DOMAINNAMEWIRE.COM, 
Mar. 3, 2008, http://domainnamewire.com/2008/03/03/5-ways-domain-names-are-better-than-
real-estate (comparing the value of real estate and online domain names). 
99. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 799 (“The websites are the ‘site’ of the infringement, not De-
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names—an essential component of a website—provide their customers 
with the websites used for infringement.100  A judge with a fairly sophisti-
cated understanding of the Internet should accept the proposition that pri-
vacy services that knowingly lease Internet domains for illegal use contrib-
ute to infringement in the same way as landlords or flea market owners 
who knowingly lease real property for illegal use. 
2.  Copyright and Trademark Share Similar Principles of Secondary 
Liability 
  A defendant privacy service would object to the application of Solid 
Host in the copyright context.  However, while the standards for trademark 
and copyright infringement are fundamentally different,101 courts have rec-
ognized that copyright and trademark share similar principles of secondary 
liability.102  
Contributory infringement “originates in tort law and stems from the 
notion that one who directly contributes to another’s infringement should 
be held accountable.”103  To illustrate, the Fonovisa flea market owner was 
also found liable for contributory trademark infringement for knowingly 
supplying the necessary marketplace for the sale of infringing products.104  
This is hardly different from the court’s rationale for its copyright in-
fringement holding,105 and, more importantly, the flea market owner’s ac-
tions satisfied both standards of contributory liability.106  If a privacy serv-
ice was found liable for contributory trademark infringement in Solid 
Host,107 then a privacy service engaging in identical acts of contribution to 
copyright infringement should also be found liable under similar copyright 
and tort law principles of secondary liability.  Accordingly, privacy serv-
ices should be held accountable for their contributory acts in either in-
fringement context. 
                                                                                                                                      
fendants’ payment networks.”). 
100. See Posting of John Moore to SonicBlog, 
http://www.sonicweblog.com/pebble/main/2007/08/21/1187728020000.html (Aug. 21, 2007, 
13:27 PST) (identifying the domain name, hosting, and website files as the three essential com-
ponents of a website). 
101. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19. 
102. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 259, 261. 
103. Id. at 259, 264. 
104. Id. at 259, 265. 
105. Id. at 261, 264 (“[I]t would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place in the 
massive quantities alleged without the support services provided by the swap meet.”). 
106. Id. at 259.  
107. Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.  
 
2011] UNMAKSING THE MASK-MAKER 41 
 
 
3.  Anonymity Is Not an Independent Contribution to Infringement  
 The “site and facilities” question may hinge on whether providing a 
domain name and anonymity are regarded by the court as separate contri-
butions to infringement.  Answering this question requires a technical un-
derstanding of how “privacy” is administered.  The registrar is the entity 
that maintains the WHOIS database and publishes registrants’ information 
therein.108 The privacy service’s act of registering a domain on behalf of its 
customer automatically triggers the input of the privacy service’s informa-
tion into the WHOIS database in place of the customer’s, which produces 
the bait-and-switch described as “anonymity.” 109  No anonymity is pro-
vided independently from the process of registering a domain on behalf of 
a third party.110  Thus, “privacy service” is a composite service involving 
domain registration, domain licensing, and the resulting anonymity protec-
tion—none of which can be isolated and analyzed as separate, volitional 
acts of contribution.  A privacy service, however, would ask the court to 
scrutinize anonymity as a separate contribution that, if considered alone, 
raises a causation issue and implicates the customer’s First Amendment 
right to speak anonymously online.111  
A court is not likely to concentrate solely on “anonymity” as an inde-
pendent contribution to infringement.  In Fonovisa, the court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the “leasing of space” should be scrutinized in 
isolation, and instead considered the leasing of space in the broader context 
of providing “the environment and the market for counterfeit recording 
sales to thrive.”112  The court considered the combined effect of providing 
the “space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and customers”113 
without scrutinizing the causal relationship between providing toilets and 
the infringement.  Similarly, the insurance against prosecution afforded by 
anonymity should be viewed in the larger context of providing an online 
safe haven for known infringers which also offers domain registration serv-
ices, as well as technical support.114  The overall “environment” created by 
                                                           
108. RAA, supra note 24, § 3.3. 
109. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 
1999) (explaining that the domain registration process is usually electronic and without human 
intervention). 
110. See Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1096. 
111. See Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 950 (D.C. 2009) (observing that anonymous 
Internet speech is protected by the First Amendment).   
112. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).. 
113. Id. 
114. See About Domains By Proxy, supra note 31. 
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the privacy service’s contributions is relevant under Fonovisa,115 and given 
that the anonymity is technically inextricable from domain registration, a 
court is unlikely to scrutinize anonymity in isolation.116 
4.  Causation 
Causation is not a required element of contributory copyright in-
fringement,117 but at least one court has read an element of “but for” causa-
tion into the material contribution analysis.  In Perfect 10, a credit card 
company was not liable for contributory copyright infringement when it 
provided an online payment transaction system for an infringing website 
because the card company “[had] no direct connection to [the] infringe-
ment.”118  The court stated that the card company did not cause the in-
fringement because the infringement could continue even without the pay-
ment system,119 and because “[a]ny conception of ‘site and facilities’ that 
encompasses [credit card companies] would also include a number of pe-
ripherally-involved third parties, such as . . . utility companies that provide 
electricity to the Internet.”120  Similarly, a defendant privacy service would 
argue that providing anonymity is a “peripheral” contribution akin to pro-
viding electricity, that the infringement would continue even if the privacy 
protection were lifted, and that privacy protection cannot therefore be the 
cause of the infringement.  
The privacy service is not a “peripheral” contributor to the infringe-
ment because it contributes the domain name—a major component of a 
“website,” which the Perfect 10 court stated would qualify as a material 
contribution.121  The very nature of the Internet and the website format is in 
the domain name system itself:  Internet addresses are the gateways to the 
server computers that comprise the Internet,122 and providing such access 
                                                           
115. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
116. See infra § II(D) (arguing that a privacy service cannot invoke the First Amendment 
right to speak anonymously as a defense to copyright infringement).  
117. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at  264 (“[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, 
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable 
as a ‘contributory’ infringer.” (quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162)).  The “or” suggests that cau-
sation is not a strict requirement of contributory copyright infringement.  
118. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 2007). 
119. Id. at 798. 
120. Id. at 800. 
121. See id. at 799. 
122. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 981-82 (9th Cir. 
1999) (“When [a person] seeks to maintain an Internet web site, that [person] must reserve . . . an 
Internet Protocol (‘IP’) Address . . . .  When an Internet user accesses the [person’s] web site, the 
user enters the domain-name combination that corresponds to the IP Address and is routed to the 
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points should be encompassed in the Ninth Circuit’s conception of a “web-
site” as a “site and facility” for online infringement.123  The added effect of 
anonymity only magnifies the privacy service’s assisting role in the in-
fringement, as it would be near impossible to operate an infringing website 
for long without the aid of an anonymous domain name.  As the district 
court duly noted in Solid Host, “[i]f [the privacy service] had returned the 
domain name to [the plaintiff], Doe’s illegal activity would have 
ceased.”124  Accordingly, privacy services do play a central causal role in 
their customers’ infringing activities.   
D.  Anonymous Infringement is Not a Constitutionally Protected Right 
Apart from objecting to discovery requests on First Amendment 
grounds, the privacy service would argue that imposing liability for provid-
ing anonymity service would violate the First Amendment rights of its cus-
tomers to speak anonymously,125 as asserted on their behalf by the privacy 
service.126  While privacy services might be inclined to frame any legal 
claim against them as an attack on anonymity itself, courts have consis-
tently recognized that “[t]hose who suffer damages as a result of tortious or 
other actionable communications on the Internet should be able to seek ap-
propriate redress by preventing the wrongdoers from hiding behind an illu-
sory shield of purported First Amendment rights.”127  The District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals has stated that the law must strike a balance 
“between the well-established First Amendment right to speak anony-
mously and the right of the plaintiff to protect its proprietary interests . . . 
through the assertion of recognizable claims based on the actionable con-
                                                                                                                                      
host computer.”). 
123. See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 799–800. 
124. Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.   
125. See Solers, 977 A.2d at 950 (observing that anonymous Internet speech is protected 
by the First Amendment).     
126. The privacy service would likely have standing to assert such a right on behalf of its 
customers.  NAACP, 357 U.S. at 459; Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392–93 
(1988) (allowing third-party standing in free speech case because of the potential chilling effect 
of a law on others).   
127. Solers, 977 A.2d at 951 n.7 (quoting In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, 
Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 35 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000)); see also Columbia, 185 F.R.D. at 578 (stating that 
“[w]ith the rise of the Internet has come the ability to commit certain tortious acts, such as defa-
mation, copyright infringement, and trademark infringement, entirely on-line . . . . People are 
permitted to interact pseudonymously and anonymously with each other so long as those acts are 
not in violation of the law.”). 
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duct of the anonymous, fictitiously-named defendant.”128  More specifi-
cally, courts have consistently recognized that the First Amendment does 
not protect copyright infringement.129    
Here, the manner in which the privacy service achieves a customer’s 
disappearance from the WHOIS database—by ceding control of the domain 
name to a known infringer while retaining ownership—amounts to an act 
of contributory copyright infringement in itself for all of the foregoing rea-
sons.130  Assuming the elements of contributory copyright infringement are 
met, the First Amendment does not bar the imposition of infringement li-
ability on privacy services,131 even if the licensing scheme produces an in-
cidental “anonymity” effect on its users.   
Accordingly, privacy services should not receive First Amendment 
protection in the limited situation in which they license domain names to 
customers who they know are engaged in infringement.  Anonymous 
speech is a fundamental right,132 but a court should not tolerate the abuse of 
anonymity to further the commission of infringement. 
E.  Sony-Betamax Does Not Protect Privacy Services 
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that a maker of a video recording device was not liable for con-
tributory copyright infringement when it sold the device to consumers who 
used the device to make copies of television broadcasts of copyrighted ma-
terial.133  The court borrowed a patent statute providing that “the sale of a 
‘staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-
infringing use’ is not contributory infringement,”134 and, in recognizing the 
similarities between patent and copyright law,135 applied the doctrine in the 
                                                           
128. Solers, 977 A.2d at 951. 
129. See Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562–63 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“The First Amendment . . . does not protect copyright infringement . . . .”); see also 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555–60, 569 (1985) (holding that 
a copyright violation which did not qualify as a “fair use” of the copyrighted material was not 
protected speech under the First Amendment).  This article assumes that the copyright holder has 
a strong infringement claim against the primary infringer, and that “fair use” does not apply. 
130. See supra § II.A–C. 
131. See Sony Music Entm’t, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 562–63 (“The First Amendment . . . does 
not protect copyright infringement . . . .”); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555–60, 569 
(holding that a copyright violation which did not qualify as a “fair use” of the copyrighted mate-
rial was not protected speech under the First Amendment). 
132. Solers, 977 A.2d at 950. 
133. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
134. Id. at 440 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)). 
135. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439, 442 (“We recognize there are substantial differences between 
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copyright context.  Staple articles of commerce include typewriters, record-
ers, cameras, and photocopying machines,136 all of which are capable of 
both infringing and legitimate uses;137 and the court reasoned that imposing 
liability for selling copying equipment would disrupt consumers’ rights to 
freely engage in areas of commerce substantially unrelated to the copyright 
sought to be protected.138  
 Innovations in copying technology have inspired a revival of the 
“staple article of commerce” defense in Internet cases.139  In Arista Records 
LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., the court rejected a defendant’s “staple article” 
defense to contributory copyright infringement when the defendant oper-
ated an online newsgroup in which users posted and downloaded infringing 
music files,140 and the defendant assisted users by providing live technical 
support.141  The court stated that a critical part of the “staple article” de-
fense is that the product maker maintains no ongoing relationship with the 
end-user after the point of sale.142  Far from doing so, and unlike manufac-
turers of video recorders, the defendant in Usenet maintained an ongoing 
relationship with users by providing technical support for their illegal 
downloads, among other communications.143  
 Domain privacy services are clearly capable of non-infringing uses.  
Privacy services arguably have some legitimate social value, as they allow 
Internet users to prevent spammers and data harvesters from gathering per-
sonal information from the WHOIS database.144  However, unlike the sale 
of a video recorder, there is no single “point of sale” after which a privacy 
service severs its relationship with end-users.145  To the contrary, privacy 
services retain ownership of their customers’ domains,146 provide twenty-
                                                                                                                                      
the patent and copyright laws.  But in both areas the contributory infringement doctrine is 
grounded on the recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly may require the courts to 
look beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the products or activities that make 
such duplication possible.”). 
136. Id. at 426. 
137. Id.  
138. Id. at 442. 
139. Wikipedia, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Corp._of_America_v._Universal_City_Studios,_Inc. (last vis-
ited Sept. 14, 2010) (referring to various cases in which the Sony-Betamax defense was raised). 
140. Arista, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 133, 156. 
141. Id. at 133. 
142. Id. at 156. 
143. Id. at 133, 156. 
144. See Domains By Proxy Homepage, supra note 67. 
145. See Domains By Proxy TOS, supra note 33. 
146. See id.  
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four hour technical support,147 share e-mail addresses with their custom-
ers,148 refuse to disclose their customers’ identities without express permis-
sion,149 and assume the online identities of their customers by replacing 
them in the WHOIS database.150  This conduct demonstrates the type of 
ongoing relationship found in Usenet.151  Accordingly, privacy services are 
not sufficiently insulated from infringement to raise a complete defense 
under Sony-Betamax.152 
F.  Privacy Services Should Not Qualify for DMCA Safe Harbor Protection 
A defendant privacy service would likely attempt to raise a DMCA 
Section 512(a) “safe harbor” defense to contributory copyright infringe-
ment.153  DMCA Section 512(a) provides immunity to contributory in-
fringement claims against “service provider[s]” that offer “routing” and 
“transmission” functions.154  In RIAA v. Verizon, the Ninth Circuit stated 
that the Section 512(a) safe harbor applies to Internet service providers per-
forming functions such as providing Internet access and “transmitting e-
mails, instant messages, or files sent by an [I]nternet user from his com-
puter to that of another [I]nternet user.”155  In another case, In re Aimster 
Copyright Litig., the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois held that a defendant peer-to-peer file transfer service was not 
eligible for Section 512(a) immunity because the service did not merely en-
able file transfer between users, but also offered file search capabilities, 
automatic resumption of interrupted downloads, one-click downloads of the 
most popular titles, and editorial comment on popular titles.156  The court 
reasoned that the defendant did more than provide a “mere conduit” for in-
formation passing through the system.157 
Assuming a domain privacy service falls under the broadly defined 
“service provider” designation,158 a privacy service would need to show 
                                                           
147. See About Domains By Proxy, supra note 31. 
148. See How Private Registrations Work, supra note 3. 
149. Domains By Proxy TOS, supra note 33, § 1.   
150. Id.  
151. Arista, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 156. 
152. Sony, 464 U.S. 417. 
153. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006). 
154. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
155. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 
1237 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
156. In re Aimster I, supra note 66, at 660. 
157. Id. at 660.  
158. Id. at 658. 
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that it performs “routing” or “transmission” functions,159 yet provides noth-
ing more than a “mere conduit” for information passing between Internet 
users.160  First, privacy services offer none of the file transfer or Internet 
access functions offered by the Verizon court as examples of routing or 
transmission functions;161 and unlike Aimster,162 no infringing material 
passes through the privacy service’s computer systems.  Licensing one’s 
domain name for another’s use merely alters the registration information in 
the WHOIS database,163 which involves no routing, transmission, or stor-
age of users’ files.164  Moreover, simply offering an e-mail forwarding 
service should not allow a privacy service to claim that it offers a “trans-
mission” function and escape liability, because the central function of the 
privacy service is to provide anonymity—not e-mail service.  Contributory 
infringement would be meaningless if every facilitator of infringement 
could qualify for Section 512(a) immunity simply by adding e-mail for-
warding to its list of offered services.   
 A registrar is an example of a service provider that might qualify for 
DMCA Section 512(a) immunity to contributory copyright infringement.  
Registrars such as GoDaddy.com165 arguably provide nothing more than a 
routing function by connecting domain names to IP addresses,166 a process 
which forms the basis of the Internet.167  While many privacy services are 
affiliated with registrars,168 they are not registrars in any sense.169  Privacy 
services are themselves the registrants and owners of the domains they li-
cense to their customers,170 and Section 512(a) would be meaningless if it 
immunized all domain registrants from infringement liability.  Privacy 
services are more akin to dealers of domain names—indeed “cyber-
landlord[s]”—than passive providers of an Internet routing function.171  
The Solid Host court adopted this position when it compared a defendant 
                                                           
159. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
160. In re Aimster I, supra note 66, at 660. 
161. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1237. 
162. In re Aimster I, supra note 66, at 660. 
163. See About Domains By Proxy, supra note 31. 
164. Domains By Proxy TOS, supra note 33. 
165. GoDaddy.com, supra note 23. 
166. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 
1999) (describing how registrars provide Internet connectivity).  
167. Id. 
168. See About Domains By Proxy, supra note 31. 
169. See id. 
170. RAA, supra note 24, § 3.7.7.3; see also Domains By Proxy TOS, supra note 33. 
171. Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2009).  
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privacy service to a property owner instead of a registrar: the “[defen-
dant’s] position is closer to that of a flea market operator . . . than . . . a reg-
istrar.”172  Privacy services do not connect their customers directly to the 
Internet; rather, they buy pieces of the Internet and lease them to their cus-
tomers, not unlike a flea market owner.173  There is no DMCA Section 
512(a) protection for that activity when it is knowingly done to assist an in-
fringer.174 
In sum, privacy services do not offer any “routing” or “transmission” 
functions because no infringing material passes through their computer sys-
tems, and domain licensing does not equate to merely providing Internet 
access.   Domain licensing is outside the purview of DMCA Section 512(a) 
protection, and the safe harbor defense should fail. 
III.   BEFORE LITIGATION, A COPYRIGHT HOLDER SHOULD SEND THE 
PRIVACY SERVICE A NOTICE OF INFRINGEMENT AND DEMAND THE 
INFRINGER’S CONTACT INFORMATION 
A copyright holder should pursue any and all avenues of obtaining an 
infringer’s identity before considering litigation.  The first step is to send 
the privacy service a notice of infringement and demand for the infringer’s 
contact information.  The letter serves two purposes:  to put the privacy 
service on notice of infringement in anticipation of suit, and to give the pri-
vacy service a chance to avoid litigation by revealing the infringer.  Sup-
port for this demand letter is found in (1) ICANN’s policies, (2) some of 
the privacy services’ own TOS agreements, and (3) case law as described 
in Part II of this article. 
A.  Failure to Respond to a Demand Letter is a Violation of ICANN Rules 
A privacy service’s failure to respond to a written demand letter is a 
violation of ICANN rules, and this should be made clear in any demand let-
ter.175  All ICANN-accredited registrars must abide by ICANN’s Registrar 
Accreditation Agreement (RAA) or risk losing accreditation.176  The RAA 
requires all registrars to enter an agreement with registrants including the 
following three provisions: (1) although registrations on behalf of third 
party licensees are permitted under the RAA, the Registered Name Holder 
                                                           
172. Id. at 1115. 
173. Id. at 1114. 
174. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
175. RAA, supra note 24, § 3.11.5. 
176. RAA, supra note 24, § 5.3. 
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must provide “information adequate to facilitate timely resolution of any 
problems that arise in connection with the Registered Name”;177 (2) the 
Registered Name Holder must “accept liability for harm caused by wrong-
ful use of the Registered Name, unless it promptly discloses . . . the identity 
of the licensee to a party providing the Registered Name Holder reasonable 
evidence of actionable harm”;178 and (3) the Registered Name Holder rep-
resents that, to the best of the name holder’s knowledge, the Registered 
Name does not directly or indirectly infringe the “legal rights of any third 
party”.179 
 Privacy services that provide their own contact information for the 
WHOIS database but fail to respond to copyright infringement complaints, 
or merely forward the complaints to their nonresponsive customers, do not 
provide any information sufficient to resolve infringement problems occur-
ring in connection with the domain.  Thus, they are likely to be in violation 
of RAA Section 3.7.7.3.180  Next, copyright infringement should constitute 
“harm caused by wrongful use of the Registered Name,”181 because the in-
fringement could not occur without the domain functioning as a locus for 
the infringing activity.  Privacy services that own and license such domains 
while refusing to either reveal licensee infringers’ identities or accept li-
ability themselves are in breach of RAA Section 3.7.7.3.182  Finally, pri-
vacy services that refuse to address infringement after receiving the first 
complaint from a copyright holder violate RAA Section 3.7.7.9 by know-
ingly allowing their domain registrations to continue to be used for copy-
right infringement.183 
Unfortunately for copyright holders, the RAA specifically excludes 
third party beneficiaries from bringing claims for breach of the RAA,184 
which precludes copyright holders from enforcing the RAA against Regis-
tered Name Holders.  Nevertheless, demand letters should remind privacy 
services that if they do not reveal their infringing customers’ contacts, 
ICANN may hold them responsible for their customers’ acts of infringe-
ment under the RAA,185 and registrars may enforce the RAA against pri-
                                                           
177. RAA, supra note 24, § 3.7.7.3. 
178. Id. 
179. RAA, supra note 24, § 3.7.7.9. 
180. See RAA, supra note 24, § 3.7.7.3. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. See RAA, supra note 24, § 3.7.7.9. 
184. RAA, supra note 24, § 5.10. 
185. See RAA, supra note 24, § 3.7.7.3. 
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vacy services by suspending, terminating, or transferring their registra-
tions.186 
B.  Failure to Reveal an Infringer’s Identity is a Violation of Most Privacy 
Services’ TOS Agreements 
Most privacy services’ Terms of Service (TOS) agreements are 
drafted in compliance with ICANN rules,187 so a violation of ICANN rules 
is likely to be a violation of the privacy service’s own TOS agreement as 
well.  For example, WhoisGuard’s TOS states that it will make available its 
customers’ registration information “to third parties as ICANN and appli-
cable laws may require or permit,”188 and Domains by Proxy’s TOS re-
serves the absolute right and power to reveal personal information in order 
“to comply with ICANN rules, policies or procedures.”189  A privacy serv-
ice's violation of its own policy might be viewed by a court as an endorse-
ment of its customers’ infringing acts, despite the privacy service’s declara-
tions of intended legal compliance in its TOS.  Evidence of a violation of 
the TOS could be used against the privacy service in a lawsuit.  A demand 
letter to a privacy service should specifically include such a warning.  
C.  Privacy Services That Refuse to Reveal Their Infringing Customers 
Should be Warned About Exposure to Liability 
Privacy services may choose not to respond to requests for contact in-
formation based solely on alleged violations of the ICANN and TOS 
agreements.  However, a strong demand letter should mention that legal li-
ability may exist for privacy services that refuse to reveal infringers under 
recent case law.190  The demand letter should mention Solid Host,191 and it 
should caution broadly that joint liability exists for intellectual property in-
fringement.192  This should sufficiently pressure the privacy service to re-
lease the infringers’ contact information, but there are potential risks.  One 
                                                           
186. RAA, supra note 24, § 3.7.7.11. 
187. See, e.g., Domains By Proxy TOS, supra note 33, § 4; WhoisGuard TOS, supra note 
34, § 8. 
188. WhoisGuard TOS, supra note 34, § 8. 
189. Domains By Proxy TOS, supra note 33, § 4.  
190. See, e.g., Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 
2009). 
191. Id.  
192. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[O]ne 
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.” (quoting 
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162)). 
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significant risk is that such a letter-writing campaign may encourage pri-
vacy services to move offshore out of fear of liability to U.S. copyright 
holders, which could create jurisdictional obstacles for copyright holders 
seeking redress for infringement.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A new demand letter to privacy services should be drafted stating that 
(1) privacy services violate the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers’ (ICANN) Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) Sec-
tions 3.7.7.3 and 3.7.7.9 by refusing to divulge infringing customers’ in-
formation or accept legal liability for the infringement;193 (2) privacy serv-
ices may be in violation of their own Terms of Service (TOS) agreements 
by refusing to reveal infringers, and such a violation can be used against 
them in a lawsuit;194 and (3) privacy services should be found liable for in-
tellectual property infringement under recent case law.195 
 If a demand letter yields no response, a copyright holder should pre-
vail against a privacy service on a contributory copyright infringement 
claim.196  A court may be reluctant to accept the necessary analogies be-
tween copyright and trademark law197 and between real estate and intellec-
tual property.198  Furthermore, the privacy service may challenge the causa-
tion199 and raise First Amendment objections.200  A privacy service is not 
likely to raise a successful Sony-Betamax,201 defense because privacy serv-
                                                           
193. See RAA, supra note 24, §§ 3.7.7.3, 3.7.7.9. 
194. See Domains By Proxy TOS, supra note 33, §4.  
195. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[O]ne 
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.” (quoting 
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162)); Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1092 
(C.D. Cal. 2009). 
196. See supra Part II. 
197. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984) 
(rejecting “the proposition that a . . . kinship exists between copyright law and trademark law . . . 
.”).  See also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (stating that a 
trademark right “has little or no analogy” to a copyright or patent (citing Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 
U.S. 311 (1872))); supra Part II.C.2. 
198. See supra Part II.C.1.   
199. See supra Part II.C.4. 
200. See supra Part II.D; see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n. 
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1383 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (raising First Amendment concerns about 
imposing copyright infringement liability when injunction against Internet service provider would 
chill its users’ speech). 
201. Sony, 464 U.S. at 417. 
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ices are not sufficiently insulated from their customers to disclaim respon-
sibility for their actions.202  A privacy service is also unlikely to raise a suc-
cessful Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Section 512(a) safe 
harbor defense, because domain licensing is not a “routing” or “transmis-
sion” function akin to providing Internet access or file transfer services.203  
A successful contributory copyright infringement suit against a privacy 
service would set a useful precedent and hopefully help ease the enforce-
ment burdens of copyright holders.  
V.  SAMPLE DEMAND LETTER TO PRIVACY SERVICES 
  
Date 
[Copyright Holder] 
Sent by: [_______] 
[Law Firm Name] 
[Law Firm Address] 
 
[Recipient Privacy Service Name/Address] 
 
Re: NOTIFICATION OF ILLEGAL USE OF YOUR REGISTERED 
DOMAIN AND REQUEST FOR USER CONTACT INFORMATION 
 
This is a notification on behalf of [copyright holder] regarding in-
fringements of [copyright holder’s] intellectual property rights occurring at 
the web domain www.________.com, which is registered in your name.  In 
accordance with ICANN’s Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA), your 
terms of service agreement with the licensee operator of 
www.___________.com, and federal law, we request that you immediately 
provide contact information for the licensee and operator of the aforemen-
tioned domain or assume liability for the infringement of [copyright 
holder’s] intellectual property rights. 
 
Pursuant to ICANN RAA Section 3.7.7.3, you are required to provide 
contact information sufficient for copyright holders to address infringement 
occurring in connection with your domain in a timely manner or accept li-
ability for such infringement.  Further, under RAA Section 3.7.7.9, you 
                                                           
202. See supra Part II.E. 
203. See supra Part II.F. 
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also represent that your registration will not be used to infringe the copy-
right of any third party.  
 
In addition, as you may already be aware, your [Terms of Service 
Agreement] states your intention to comply with ICANN policies and the 
law.  [This section must be tailored for each privacy service as their terms 
of service vary].  Specifically, [common language in terms of service 
agreements states that the service will identify infringers who break 
ICANN rules and/or the law].   
 
Furthermore, as you likely are aware, recent federal case law holds 
that privacy services may be liable for operators’ underlying intellectual 
property infringement.204  Should you refuse to identify the aforementioned 
infringer, we caution that you may be exposed to liability for your domain 
licensees’ usage of your registered name for purposes of infringement. 
 
Accordingly, we request that you provide information sufficient for 
[copyright holder] to identify the operator of www._________.com so that 
we may contact them directly regarding the infringement.  Any refusal to 
comply with this request may expose you to liability for the underlying in-
fringement, and in addition, your registrar may be required to terminate 
your registration under RAA Section 3.7.7.11. 
 
The following links and screenshots demonstrate unauthorized use of 
[copyright holder’s] content at www.________.com, which is registered in 
your name:  
  
  [Links] 
  
  [Screenshots] 
 
In addition to providing a working contact for the licensee operator of 
your domain, we ask that you preserve all evidence of infringement, includ-
ing any correspondence with the operator, in anticipation of [copyright 
holder] serving a subpoena to obtain this information through legal process. 
                                                           
204. See Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1092, 1105–06; see also Transamerica Corp. v. 
Moniker Online Servs., 672 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1363–64 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (denying domain privacy 
service’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s contributory cybersquatting claim). 
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Sincerely, 
 
[Counsel] 
[Firm] 
Paulo André de Almeida205 
 
                                                           
205 J.D. Loyola Law School, Los Angeles 2011; B.A., University of Southern California.  
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